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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER AFTER OFFEROR'S DEATH
-UNAUTHORIZED
COMMUNICATIONS: Somewhat earlier this year an
unusual factual situation was presented to the Orphan's Court of Philadelphia,
and that learned court responded by handing down an equally unique opinion.,
And by its very uniqueness it suggests a possible exception to one of the most
firmly entrenched principles of the law of contracts, a principle which had previously admitted no exceptions.
It appeared from the evidence that prior to 1944, Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust
Company had been named executor of a will then in existence of one Emma G.
Yeager. In June, 1944, another will was prepared by Mrs. Yeager's attorney, in
which Fidelity and Edna Powell Frederick, niece of the testatrix, were appointed
executors. In October of 1944, Mrs. Yeager, in the presence of the assistant
trust officer of Fidelity, signed the following statement as to the commissions
of the two executors: "Approved, Co-executor to receive fees equal to the corporate executor's fees ...
"
On June 21, 1946, a draft of the will in question, written by Mrs. Yeager's
attorney, was received by Fidelity, and therein C. Middleton Harlan, the trusted
business advisor of the testatrix, was added as a third executor. On the same day,
Mrs. Yeager notified the trust company that she wanted Mr. Harlan to receive
the same commissions as the other executors. It was explained to her that such
would result in unusually high commissions, but Mrs. Yeager, because she had
not remembered him in her will and desired to make a bequest in the guise of
commissions, insisted that her wishes be carried out. The oral direction was followed by one in writing, which read: "It is my wish and desire that C. Middleton
Harlan receive the same commissions as the Fidelity Trust Company and Edna
Powell Frederick." A few days later, the testatrix signed the will in question. The
will itself contained nothing concerning the commissions to be paid the executors.
It did not appear that either Mrs. Frederick or Mr. Harlan knew of the writing concerning the commissions before the death of Mrs. Yeager in October, 1948.
Nevertheless, eight days after her death, letters testamentary were issued to the
three executors.
Exceptant, one of the residuary legatees, objected to the large credit for commissions taken by the three executors, on the ground that since neither of the individual executors knew of the alleged agreement fixing their commissions until
after the death of the testatrix, there could be no meeting of the minds which
was essential to the making of a contract, and that hence there was merely an offer which was revoked by the death of the testatrix.
1 Yeager Estate, 69 D. & C. 228 (1950).
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This objection was almost summarily dismissed by the auditing judge because it failed "to give effect to the principle that a person for whose benefit
two other persons make a contract, can enforce the terms of such contract," citing
Copeland's Estale2 and the Restatement of Contracts § 133.
But the court, sitting en banc, while agreeing with the result, did not agree
that it was a case of a third party beneficiary contract. The court, per Hunter,
J., said:
...The compensation of the trust company was separately fixed
by testatrix, and the 'same' or 'equal' compensation was provided for the
others. The trust company made no contract as to the compensation of the
other executors, but was merely custodian of the writings which fixed
the latter's compensation. The company made no gift to the others, and
conceded no right of its own. The generosity flowed from the testatrix
herself."
What the court in effect said was that the trust company, if deemed a promisee, had promised nothing in return for the benefits to be received by the individual executors. This reasoning seems quite correct, for it is quite apparent that
Mrs. Yeager and the trust company never intended that there should be any binding agreement between them, for the benefit of third persons.
But by rejecting the reasoning of the auditing judge, the court was faced
squarely with the exceptant's contention that the writing in question was merely
an offer which was revoked upon the death of the offeror. Obviously, there was
no contract in existence at the time of the death of the testatrix, between her and
the individual executors, for the latter were in utter and complete ignorance of
the writing until after the death of the testatrix. Nor was the compensation of
the individual executors fixed by the will; it was fixed by separate and supplementary papers. But how then was the court to dispose of the exceptant's contention? What were they to do with the established rule that death of the offeror revokes the offer?
The court did allow the commissions, and they did allow the offer to be accepted after the death of the offeror. But lest the court be accused of oversight,
thLey did recognize the general rule; but by declaring its inapplicability to the
peculiar facts before them, they disregarded it. The court had no precedent to rely
on in doing so, for the problem had never before been presented to the Pennsylvania courts, nor, so far as this writer has been able to discover, to the courts of
any other state. Recognizing the novelty of the situation, and the inconsistency
of the desired result with established principles of the law of contracts, the court
said:
"It is not our purpose in this opinicn to lay down general rules of
law. Our opinion is, in the case at hand, wbere an executor was not aware
2 315 Pa. 25, 169 A. 367 (1933).
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of a writing fixing his compensation, that it operates as an offer which he
may accept by the taking of letters testamentary, or refuse by renunciation
of the executorship. We thus, assimilate this writing to a testamentary
writing which fixes the compensation of the executor. We reject the contention of the exceptant that it was revoked by death."
At the risk of being repetitious, it might be well for us to note carefully just
what the court is doing. To treat the writing as an offer is to call into operation
the conceded rule that a revocable offer is terminated by the death of the offeror.
Desiring to avoid the rule without rejecting it, the court assimilates the writing
to a testamentary writing which fixes the compensation of the executor. This the
court does for the purpose of permitting the application of the well settled principle that where an executor accepts his fiduciary position by taking out letters
testamentary, he thereby becomes bound by the terms of the will fixing his compensation. 3 Thu first of the line of Pennsylvania cases declaring this result apparently was that of Hay's Estate.4 Therein is used some language which is of interest for our purposes. There the testator directed: "To each of the executors of this
my last will and testament, I bequeath the sum of one thousand dollars, as and
for compensation for their services as executors." In holding that neither of the
executors could credit themselves with a greater compensation than that indicated by the will, the court, per Mr. Justice Green, said:
"In the foregoing case (Harper'sAppeal, 111 Pa. 243) the relation
between trustee and the estate of the decedent was viewed in the light of
a contract for the payment of the services to be rendered, and was held obligatory on the estate and upon all others interested therein. We know
of no reason why the same principle should not be applicable to an executor who accepts the trust with the compensation fixed by the will. He
is under no obligation to accept the trust. If he does not like its terms he
is perfectly at liberty to decline it. But if he accepts it and claims his
right to act as executor under the will, certainly he is bound by the terms
in which the right is given ....It is the general rule relating to all contracts and grants of powers or rights that he who accepts them must take
them subject to the duties or burdens with which they are charged."
(Italics supplied).
There can be little doubt that the rule expounded by this line of cases is a
good one. But note that the court in the above case attempted to interpret the
situation there facing it in the light of a contract for the payment of services to
be rendered. The court did not take into consideration the rule of contracts that the
death of an offeror revokes the offer; and well they might refuse to do so, for
it was not a necessary part of the analogy which they were attempting to draw,
viz., that as when one accepts an offer, he does so subject to the burdens imposed
thereby, so when he accepts an executorship, he is bound by the duties and burdens imposed by the will.
3 Constable's Estate, 299 Pa. 509, 149 A. 743 (1930); Lennig's Estate, 53 Pa. Super. 596,
(1913).
4 183 Pa. 296, 38 A. 622 (1897).
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Thus it becomes apparent that the statement made by Justice Green does not
add support to the reasoning of the principal case. The Philadelphia court attempts
to draw the analogy in the opposite direction, assimilating the acceptance of an
offer to the acceptance of an executorship according to the terms of a will. The
flaw in this analogy is that while the death of the offeror revokes the offer, the
death of the testatrix is a necessary prerequisite to the taking effect of the will and
the terms therein included. It is true that if the offer were not revoked by the
death of the offoror the analogy would be more complete. But would it not seem
then that the court was putting the cart before the horse?
Upon reading the principal case, one cannot help but feel that in such a situation the executor should be permitted to accept the offer as to his commission
made by the decedent, for to refuse such would be to defeat the express intention
of the decedent. Is it possible then that there is to be an exception created to the
aforementioned principle that a revocable offer is terminated upon the death of
the offeror? It would seem that an exception is desirable and appropriate in a situation such as appeared in the principal case. Could it not be stated generally that
where an offer is made which the offeror does not intend to be accepted, and
which may be impossible af acceptance, until after his, the offeror's, death, it may
be accepted after death, thereby creating a binding and enforceable contract? Until the date of decision of the principal case, no such exception has ever been proposed. No exception is made by the Restatement of Contracts,' nor by Professor
Williston in his learned treatise on contracts;6 nor does it appear that the Pennsylvania courts have ever considered such an exception. But does it follow that
an exception of this nature would prove unwise? Suppose the following hypothetical situation: In his will X names A as executor. A, an attorney, has always
been a close friend of X and has handled all of X's legal problems. Nothing is
mentioned in the will concerning the compensation to be paid the executor, but
X writes a letter to A in which he tells A that he has named him executor of his
will and offers A a compensation of $5000 if he will accept the exzcutorship.
The compensation offered is in excess of what could be considered a reasonable
compensation. The letter stat'es that in realization that A is a busy man, X expects
no answer and that if upon his death A finds that he will be able to undertake
the executorship, he shall simply take out letters testamentary, whence he shall
become entitled to the compensation stated in the letter. Upon the death of X, A
takes out letters and proceeds to administer the estate. If we permit the suggested exception to the rule that death of the offeror revokes the offer, A will
be able to accept X's offer and credit himself with commissions to the extent of
$5000. Does there appear to be any injustice in permitting A to accept such an
offer? On the contrary, the injustice would be done if he were refused the commissions stipulated in the letter.
5 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 48.

6 WILLISTON ON CONTRAcTs § 62 (Rev. Ed. 1936).
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To allow such an exception, another rule of contracts must be invaded. This
principle has very recently been reiterated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

in the case of Bershad v. Chester Nest No. 1228, Order of Owls of Chester, Pa.,'
as follows:
"...An
directly, or by
valid contract
233; Munhall

acceptance must be communicated
some definitive act such as placing
is created. Groskin v. Bookmyer,
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 300 Pa. 327,

to the offeror, either
it in the mail before a
310 Pa. 588, 166 A.
150 A. 645."

As will be seen immediately, a communication of the acceptance of the offer
to the offeror is impossible in the situations wherein the proposed exception
would operate, for in all such instances the offeror would be dead. But by recognizing the impossibility thereof, can we not do away with the rule in this instance,
when to follow it would be to work an injustice by defeating the intention of the
parties? Furthermore, in such cases, the decedent's intention would seem to be that
the taking out of letters was to constitute acceptance of the offer which he has
advanced. As such, it could hardly be contended that the offeree could not accept the offer by doing the very act which the offeror stipulated was to constitute acceptance. And if the offeror did not contemplate communication of the
acceptance, why should the law require it for him?
But assuming this proposed exception, it could not be applied with any controlling effect in the principal case, for there is present in that case another peculiarity, which the court did not see fit to discuss. To understand this element
of the case, it must be noted that not only did the individual executors accept the
offer after the death of the testatrix, but thty were entirely ignorant thereof until after her death. Actually, they learned of the offer from an employee of
the trust company, the corporate executor. This situation should be compared with
the following statement found in the Restatement of Contracts:8
"An offeree, therefore, cannot ordinarily accept an offer unless
its terms have been communicated to him by the offeror. This may be
done through the medium of an agent; but mere information indirectly
received by one party that another is willing to enter into a bargain is not
an offer by the latter."
It did not appear in the evidence that it was the intention of the testatrix that
the corporate executor should act as her agent for the purpose of communicating
her offer to the individual executors. Thus we are left with an offer which has
been unauthorizedly communicated to the offeree after the death of the offeror.
In the words of the Restatement, this is not an offer. Consequently, it must follow
that it was also incapable of being accepted. Nevertheless, the court permitted
acceptance.
1-

Pa. -,

72 A.2d 116 (1950).

8 RF$TATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 23, comment a.
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The facts of tht principal case also posed a final question which, however,
was apparently not considered by court or counsel. Note that the language used by
Mrs. Yeager was: "It is my wish and desire that C. Middleton Harlan receive
" Is this tht usual wording of an offer? Would it apthe same commissions ..
pear from the language used by the testatrix that she intended the proposed commissions to be binding on the residuary legatees, or would it appear rather that
she was merely expressing a wish or desire that the residuary legatees recogni&
the proposed commissions? It would seem to this writer that the words used
were precatory in nature and therefore incapable of being accepted with binding
effect:
In conclusion thin, it would appear that there is the possibility of an exception to the general rule that a revocable offer is terminated upon the death
of the offeror. This appears in the instance where an offer has been made which
the offeror does not intend to be accepted during his life, but only upon his death.
As is the rule in all cases of offers, however, the offer must be communicated
ither by the offeror or in some manner authorized by him.
Donald E. Wieand
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CONFLICT OF LAWS-DOMICILE-DIVORCE: After approximately
three years of litigation, a case which has been viewed with considerable interest
by local students of Conflicts of Laws has finally been concluded.
This case of Smith v. Smith' originated in a court of equity in Cumberland
County in 1946, when the plaintiff, Bernice G. Smith, brought a bill to enjoin a
divorce action started in Florida by her husband, Luther B. Smith. After a preliminary injunction had been granted, defendant moved the Florida court to dismiss the divorce action and sought to have the injunction dissolved. The injunction was dissolved but the lower court retained jurisdiction of the bill. After various other legal moves, defendant began divorce proceedings anew in Florida, and
again an injunction was obtained by the plaintiff. This injunction was continued
until a final hearing was had, after which the lower court dissolved the injunction. An appeal followed.
A majority of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the lower court, and
found that the evidence amply supported the chancellor's findings and that such
findings made it clear that defendant was a Florida domiciliary.
Ordinarily, a case of this nature would pass as an insignificant bit of litigation and be of no particular import, except perhaps to the parties involved.
But, it is the opinion of this writer that cases of this type should be given more
than average attention, because there is involved an element of bona fides, which
must be considered, if parties are to be prevented from presenting to the court
"hand made" situations, which have been concocted to obtain the desired results
of the individual parties.
"Bona fide" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "in or with good faith;
honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud."
Reviewing the evidence upon which the court based its decision, we find
that considerable weight is given to statements made by the defendant to the effect that he intended to spend less time in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, and that he
would make his home in Florida. Further, defendant rented a house in Florida
and later bought a home there, costing, as the court notes with particularity,
$82,000. It is this writer's contention, that for a man of considerable means, as
was the defendant in this case, such an amount might be relatively insignificant,
if an ulterior purpose were to be accomplished by the expenditure. The court notes
further that Smith became listed in Camp Hill as a non-resident taxpayer in 1947,
and that thereafter he paid his taxes in Florida. After 1946, he filed his federal
tax returns in Florida, which, as the court points out, must be filed at the legal
residence of the taxpayer. Evidently Mr. Smith was well versed in the law. Defendant also had his name removed from the voting registry in Camp Hill, and
registered to vote in Dade County, Florida. His automobile driver's license, pass1 364 Pa. 1,70 A.2d 630 (1950).
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port and student pilot certificate were all shown
his home address. And finally, Smith resigned
Club in Camp Hill, and from several fraternal
order to join the Miami Elks Lodge, and the La
Beach.

to bear the state of Florida as
from the West Shore Country
organizations in Harrisburg in
Gorce Country Club, at Miami

As to this the court says:
"In view of the evidence it is impossible to conceive of what more
defendant could have done to establish himself as a Florida domiciliary."
The words "establish himself" in the above quotation should be given careful attention. In a dissenting opinion by Justice Steame which was concurred in
by Justice Jones, the above allegations are answered directly in the following words:
"And all of his testimony, so injected, as to his Florida domicile,
consisted of self-serving declarations and acts manifestly set up to give
semblance of verity to his claim of changed domicile. Voting, paying
taxes, joining clubs, etc., were all matters within defendant's exclusive
control."
Let us review the evidence of the plaintiff. The courts have said in the past
that a "motive may reflect on a person's intent to change domicile." 2 Plaintiff
contended that defendant's sole motive was to obtain a divorce, and based this
contention on undisputed evidence of adultery. As to plaintiff's contention, the
court answered, that whatever was defendant's motive, he did establish his intent
to make Florida his domicile. The court says that intent must be given careful
scrutiny, but it remained for Justice Stearne to give it that scrutiny advocated by
the majority. He concludes:
"In truth and in fact the testimony adduced by the defendant discloses that his chief interest in trying to obtain a new domicile in a foreign jurisdiction was that he might be able thereby to secure a divorce
for which he had no grounds in the marital domicile. The question of
domicile was but incident to his main purpose."
Dean Goodrich in his work on the Conflict of Laws' notes that "motive may
be very important in deciding as a fact whether the alleged intention was genuine." In view of the evidence of desired divorce, and other motives of the defendant brought out in the litigation the question of defendant's true intention appears of doubtful good faith. As Dean Goodrich points out further, and as recognized by the courts, 4

2 Commonwealth ex rel Meth v. Meth, 156 Pa. Super. 632 ,41 A.2d 752 (1944).
S GOODRICH, CONFLICTS OF LAW sec. 26 p. 44, (2d Ed. 1938).
4 See note 3, supra; also; Williamson v. Ostenton 232 U. S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. 442, 58 L. Ed

758 (1913); Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. 289, 32 L. Ed. 690 (1889); Case v.
Clark, 5 Mason 70, Fed. Cas. No. 2490 (1828); Plant v. Harrison, 36 Misc. 649, 74 N. Y. S.
411, (1902); JACOBS, LAW OF DOMICILE, sec. 142, (1887).
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"But the motive inducing the alleged change of domicile may lead,
or help lead, the trier of fact to conclude that there really was not a
change of domicile at all, but the appearance of a change made for the
purpose of securing some personal advantage.
Plaintiff, relying on In Re Dorrance's Estate6 contended that the acts and
statements were not enough, in view of his motive, to establish the necessary intent. The court attempted to distinguish the facts of that case from those of
the principal case. Because Dorrance had a large home in Pennsylvania, while
only a small one in New Jersey; because Dorrance spend most of his time at his
Pennsylvania home; and because in that instance Dorrance's motives were to avoid
payment of Pennsylvania taxes, New Jersey could not be considered his bona fide
domicile. In that case, his motive in evading a Pennsylvania law destroyed the
bona fide character of his claimed domicile, and the court held Pennsylvania to
be his domicile regardless of his professions to the contrary. However, in the
Smith case the court notes carefully the fact that the Florida house cost $82,000;
but the value of his home in Camp Hill was not in evidence. It is suggested that
the motive for changing domicile, appearing to be to obtain a divorce in Florida
when one was not available in Pennsylvania for lack of legal grounds, lends support to plaintiff's contention that the Florida venture was not bona fide.
There was testimony that defendant offered plaintiff a settlement of
$400,000 to be paid over a period of 20 years; also that defendant tendered a
deed to the Camp Hill residence. This was noted by the court to show that plaintiff had no right to complain of hardship. Could it not also be cited to show that
defendant's change of location was not bona fide, but merely part of an overall
scheme for the severance of his marital ties?
The bona fide character of this defendant's action is easily attacked from
many points. As is noted in the dissent, it appeared on record without contradiction, that if the defendant were prevented from going ahead with the Florida
divorce, he would go into another state and begin another action. Using the words
of Justice Stearne:
"In my opinion, defendant's pretended change of domicile from
Pennsylvania to Florida, in the circumstances of this case, constitutes a
fraud and a sham."
The humble opinion of this writer is in accord with that of the learned Justice
Stearne, for it appears that after 29 years of married life, the defendant having
determined to secure a divorce, and having the means but not the cause to do so,
has circumvented public policy as well as the law, and may well achieve his purpose.
A grave question is presented to the people of the Commonwealth
as a result of this decision. We must present the query: "Is the Supreme
5 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932).
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Court of Pennsylvania prepared to 'place its blessing' on migratory divorces?"
The record of this case clearly shows an intent to go to Florida for such a purpose
and for such a purpose alone. Tht writer points again to defendant's statements
on the record, that if he could not get a divorce in Florida he would go elsewhere.
This case, then, sets out certain conditions for securing a migratory divorce,
all of which as is noted, are within the control of a party; and it appears that if
these conditions are met, a migratory divorce becomes a strong possibility at least
in so far as jurisdiction is concerned, and with the apparent approval of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. It is this writer's opinion that such a result is wrong
and should not be permitted to exist.
The courts in this commonwealth, through their decisions, are a strong assistant in the molding of public policy. In the past our public policy in maintaining the marital status, once it has been consummated, has been a strong one. We
must flash the light of warning lest this public policy be shaken by decisions of this
sort, and tht very buttresses of our society be shaken by its impact.
Arthur L. Goldberg
Note: Since the writing of the above note, it has been brought to the attention of the writer, that the divorce action instigated in Florida by Mr. Smith,
has been dismissed on the merits.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

REAL PROPERTY - TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES - GRANTEES
NOT HUSBAND AND WIFE - JOINT TENANCY: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Maxwell v. Saylor' established that a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship results from a conveyance to a man and
woman, ostensibly but not legally husband and wife, as tenants by entireties, where
the survivor paid the entire consideration. This decision was followed recently by
the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Frederick v. Southwick,2 which involved a
conveyance by a man to himself and a woman, ostensibly but not legally his wife,
as tenants by entireties. Here, too, the court decided that the conveyance created
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. (In the Frederick case, however, the
source of the property was not the survivor.) Because the Maxwell case seemed
to turn upon the consideration being paid by the survivor, it is the purpose of
this note to determine whether the decision in the Frederick case can be justified
in the absence of a similar consideration.
The facts of Maxwell v. Saylor are briefly as follows: Maxwell, decedent,
left his wife to live with Emma Saylor. His intimacy with her was such that they
became known in the neighborhood as husband and wife. During the time of
this cohabitation, real property was conveyed "To Raymond Maxwell and Emma
Maxwell, his wife, and their heirs and assigns as tenants by the entireties." All consideration, plus interest on the bond and mortgage given as part of the purchase
price, was paid by Emma Saylor. At the death of Maxwell his daughter brought
an action for partition against Emma Saylor.
The majority opinion which denied partition in the Maxwell case relied in
part on the intention of the parties, saying, 3
"Their declared intention was an estate per tout et non per my.
This was the equivalent of saying in so many words that they desired to
establish a right of survivorship.4 Therefore, a joint tenancy with right
of survivorship, an estate per my et per tout, best effectuates the declared intention of the grantees to the extent legally permissible; that such
form of joint ownership for unmarried persons most closely approximates tenancy by entireties enjoyed by lawfully married parties since in
both instances the survivor takes the whole.'
The majority dismissed the contention that the Act of March 31, 18125 would
interfere with their decision, and said,
1 359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355 (1948), noted 22 TEMPLE L. Q. 228 (1948); 97 U. oF PA. L.
REV. 132 (1948).
2 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (July 15, 1949).
a Supra, note 1, at p. 96.
4 Here the court cited two Maryland cases (these were seemingly the only authority relied
upon), Michael v. Lucas, 152 Md. 512, 137 A. 287 (1927), which the dissent points out did not
uphold the majority contention because the granting clause in this case contained the additional
words, "the survivor of them", and Mitchell v. Frederick, 166 Md. 421, 170 A. 733 (1934) in
which the granting clause contained similar additional words.
5 P. L. 259, 5 Sm. L. 395, 20 P. S. 395. This act abolishes the right of survivorship as an

attribute or necessary incident of joint tenancy.
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"...that statute does not prevent the creation of the right of survivorship by the express words of a will or deed or by necessary implication, and no6 particular form of words is required to manifest such
an intention."
Reliance was also placed upon the consideration's being paid in whole by the
survivor. Perhaps the case of Maxwell v. Saylor can be fully justified by the majority contention concerning the equities of the situation; the'court said in part,
1...it is inconceivable that the parties could have intended under
such circumstances that upon Maxwell's death she should be deprived
of any part of the title to property which was acquired by the fruits of
her own labor."
The dissenting opinion in the Maxwell case based its argument on, (a) the
fact that the decision was contrary to the weight of authority, 7 citing numerous
authorities; 8 (b) that an analogy to the doctrine of cy pres9 should not apply to
conveyances of real property; and (c) the fact that the quality of seisin of the two
estates was different.
In the Frederick case a bill in equity was brought by John Frederick, administrator of the estate of James Frederick, deceased, against Emma C. Southwick,
known also as Emma L. Frederick, to cancel, as fraudulent, a deed from plaintiff's
decedent to decedent and defendant as tenants by the entireties and to set aside,
as fraudulent, the transfer of a savings account of decedent to decedent and defendant as tenants by entireties. After hearing, the chancellor entered a decree
nisi declaring the marriage void and concluding that the grantees were tenants
in common of the real estate and jointly owned the savings account. Approximately three weeks before the adjudication of the trial judge was filed, the case of
Maxwell v. Saylor was decided. The appellant (Southwick) filed exceptions nunc
pro tunc averring that appellant was a joint tenant with right of survivorship
(not a tenant in common as previously averred in her answer) and claimed, pursuant to that opinion, the entire estate. On the exceptions to the decree nisi the
court en banc considered the Maxwell case, determined that a tenancy in common
was created, and entered a final decree. Emma C. Southwick appealed, contending
error in the finding. Apparently, the lower court did not consider the rule of the
Maxwell case applicable in thet Frederick case. On appeal the Superior Court reversed the decree of the lower court and held, under the rule pronounced in the
Maxwell case, that the appellant was entitled to the entire estate in that she and
the decedent held the property as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
6 The court here cited among other cases, Arnold v. Jack's Executors, 24 Pa. 57 (1859);
Jones v. Cable, 114 Pa. 586, 7 A. 791 (1887); Redemptorist Fathers v. Lawler, 205 Pa. 24, 54
A. 487 (1903); Wright's Estate, 348 Pa. 76, 34 A.2d 57 (1943).
7 Supra, note 1, at p. 98.
8 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 183, 185; TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY 3rd ed., vol. 2, sections 418, 425 and 430 and supplement; 48 C. J. S. p. 927; and see note 92 A. L. R. 142 (the
cases are uniform in holding that conveyances by entireties are strictly limited to lawful spouses)
Perrin v. Harrington, 130 N. Y. S. 994, 146 App. Div. 292 (1911).
9 Supra, note 1, at p. 98.
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The Supreme Court in the Maxwell case and the Superior Court in the Frederick case both rely on the statement made in Thornton v. Price,10 that when
parties intend to take as tenants by entireties the fact of failure of marriage does
not prevent them from taking as tenants in common or as joint tenants with
right of survivorship, whichever is most appropriate under the circumstances. The
Frederick case also cites the Maxwell case for this proposition. However, this
was merely dictum" in the Thornton case.
As can be seen, it is somewhat difficult to reconcile the Frederick and the
Maxwell cases. The deciding factor of the Maxwell case seems to have been that
the successful party paid the whole consideration for the property in question.
While this question was brought up by the appellees, it was not discussed in the
Frederick case and the court summarily dismissed it by stating that the rule of
the Maxwell case was decided on the basis of the intention of the parties and leaves
us to infer that consideration had nothing to do with that decision.' 2
It is difficult to conceive that a completely new and minority view 13 should
be adopted on the strength of a rule pronounced by a divided court in a case that
was seemingly decided on the equities of the situation at hand.
Isaac I. Serata
10 328 Pa. 11, 16, 194 A. 897, 899 (1937).
11 As pointed out by the dissent in the Maxwell case. In the Thorion case the issue was

whether or not a married woman had the power to convey title to her own real estate, because of
desertion and non-support, under the terms of the Act of May 4, 1855, P. L. 430, 48 P. S. 42,
and whether the joinder of a supposed husband (as her original husband still lived) did not revoke the woman's power to make the deeds.
12 It should be noted: 1) That the appellees advanced the argument that because appellant
claimed in her answer as a tenant in common she is barred thereafter to claim as a holder of a
different tenure. The court dismissed this by saying that the misnomer of her tenure by her counsel
has not the slightest bearing on the intention of the parties at the execution of the deed. It constituted no more than legal conclusion, later to be proven erroneous. 2) The estate was rendered
unable to satisfy expenses of the funeral, of the last illness, and administration.
Is Supra, note 8.

